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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
stances. 67 Therefore, counsel should take care to include all amounts
due at the time when he initiates his original action in order to
insure collection of all the sums due.
Guidelines established for attorney's fees recoverable
when indemnitor "leaves" indemnitee.
In Clarke v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,6 plain-
tiff, a firm of consulting engineers and landscape architects, agreed
to indemnify the State for any damage resulting from the plain-
tiff's negligence. Pursuant to this agreement, plaintiff was "im-
pleaded" 6 in a supreme court action against the individual con-
tractors and "vouched-in" 70 in an action commenced in the Court
of Claims. Upon notice to their insurer of these pending actions,
and the subsequent "repudiation" by the insurer of the contractual
agreement to defend,7 ' plaintiff acquired the assistance of a private
law firm. The court, awarding damages to the plaintiff for the
costs of these services, held that one who is "vouched-in" or "im-
pleaded" is himself being sued.72 Thus, where the insurance con-
tract stipulates that the company shall defend any suit against the
insured no matter how "groundless, false or fraudulent," the factual,
legal or jurisdictional validity of the commenced suit does, not
vitiate the duty to defend.
73
In addition to a lengthy discussion of the "vouching-in pro-
cedure," Clarke offers the practitioner a detailed guideline for
67 Haviland shows that the courts will not go out of their way to vacate
a prior judgment in order to nullify the defense of splitting a cause of
action, unless there are circumstances which would make it manifestly un-
just to bar the second action. See also Maloney v. McMillan Book Co.,
52 Misc. 2d 1006, 277 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Syracuse City Ct. 1967).
68 55 Misc. 2d 327, 285 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
60See CPLR 1007.70See 2 WEIysTmIN, KoRN & MILLER, NFW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
111007.03 (1965). See generally Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. First Nat!l
Bank, 281 N.Y. 162, 22 N.E.2d 324 (1939); The Biannual Survey of New
York Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 122, 145-46 (1965).
71 See 55 Misc. 2d 327, 330, 285 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 n.1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1967). The court stated that by repudiating in relation to the Court
of Claims action, it was not necessary that additional notice be given the
insurer of the subsequent impleading of plaintiff in the supreme court pro-
ceeding. The latter, the court held, is an anticipatory breach. Id. at 352,
235 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
72 Two cases of similar conclusion are Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., I
N.Y.2d 439, 136 N.E.2d 434, 154 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1956) (injunction action
held to be a "suit for money damages" under the insurance contract);
Madawick Contracting Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E.2d
520 (1954) (arbitration held a "suit").
73See Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 44 N.E.2d
131 (1948) which the court considered an adequate analogy to the instant
case.
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determining what attorney's fees an insured is entitled to when his
indemnitor leaves him. "Leaving him," the court implied, occurs
when the insurer, upon notice of suit, fails to defend its client
within a reasonable time thereafter. In such a situation, the insurer
will be liable for all reasonable attorney's fees in relation to suits
actively pending against its insured.
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
Article 31: Disclosure available to obtain material in
opposition to motion attacking personal jurisdiction.
In Cronin v. New England Storage Warehouse Co.,7 the
plaintiff sought damages for breach of contract. In his answer the
defendant alleged, inter alia, that the court had no personal juris-
diction; and in a letter to the plaintiff the defendant made it known
that he was going to move for a dismissal on that ground. The
plaintiff then served written interrogatories upon the defendant
concerning the question of jurisdiction; and the defendant moved
for a protective order striking the interrogatories.75 The defendant
on the basis of pre-CPLR cases 6 claimed that disclosure was not
available to obtain material to oppose a motion attacking the court'sjurisdiction. The court held that under the CPLR the remedy of
disclosure is definitely available on a motion attacking jurisdiction
of defendant's person, and is available in the case even, though the
jurisdictional motion is not yet pending.
CPLR 3211 (d) provides that if it appears, from affidavits sub-
mitted in opposition to a motion made under CPLR 3211(a) 77
or (b), that there are facts essential to justify the opposition, "the
court may . . . order a discontinuance to permit . . . disclosure
to be had. . . ." The decision in Cronin seems to fall within the
design of CPLR 3211(d)7 " and the disclosure provisions of article
31. Much time and expense may be saved if the merit or lack
of merit of defendant's motion can be established prior to the
hearing of the motion.
74 54 Misc. 2d 1088, 284 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1967).
75 CPLR 3103 provides for the issuance by the court of protective orders
regulating the use of disclosure in order to prevent prejudice to any of
the parties.
76 Norton v. Cromwell, 248 App. Div. 107, 290 N.Y.S. 707 (1st Dep't
1936); In re Erlanger, 231 App. Div. 70, 246 N.Y.S. 745 (Ist Dep't
1930); Debrey v. Hanna, 182 Misc. 824, 45 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1943).
77 CPLR 3211 (a) (8) allows a person to move for a dismissal on the
ground of lack of personal jurisdiction.
78 "The clear intendment of the rules is to permit disclosure to elicit
pertinent evidence concerning proof of issues involving jurisdictional ques-
tions." 54 Misc. 24 at 1088-89, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
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